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E 
Welfare Reform: Implications and Alternatives 
Neil Gilberl 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the details remain unsettled, a blueprint of the Congressional 
proposal for reform of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) program was included in the 1995 Budget Reconciliation Bill 
(vetoed by the President). It is a blueprint for change that will alter the 
essential character of AFDC. If Congress has its way, funding for the 
program will be converted from an open-ended categorical grant to a block 
grant capped at $16.3 billion for fiscal years 1996 through 2002. Recipients 
will be required to work within two years of receiving benefits, with 
eligibility for cash assistance limited to no longer than five years over their 
lifetime. The proposal for reform includes additional nuances such as fiscal 
incentives tying increases in block grants to reductions in out-of-wedlock 
births and a provision allowing states to exempt 15% of their AFDC 
case loads from the five-year limit on eligibility.! 
Basically, however, it is the block grant and work requirement 
reinforced by time-limited eligibility that constitute the fundamental 
transformation of AFDC - achieving Bill Clinton's campaign promise to 
"end welfare as we know it," if not exactly along the lines he envisioned. 
While it is clear that AFDC will no longer be the same, there is much 
uncertainty about the consequences of this radical reform. The following 
analysis surveys the problems and prospects of state-level experiments 
* Neil Gilbert is Acting Dean and Chemin Professor of Social Welfare at the School 
of Social Welfare, University of California at Berkeley. His most recent publication is 
WELFARE JUSTICE: RESTORING SOCIAL EQUALITY (Yale University Press, 1995). 
1. SOCIAL LEGISLATION INFO. SERV., Budget Reconciliation Act Social Programs , WASH. 
SOCIAL LEGISLATION BULLETIN, Nov. 27, 1995, at 85, 86. On August 22, 1996, after this 
Symposium took place, President Clinton signed the the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 11 0 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
Among other provisions, the Act dismantles the sixty-one-year-old Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Id. 
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL 323 
324 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:2 
fostered by block grants, the future of public welfare services under block 
grants, and the inherent limits of work requirements. The analysis 
concludes with an alternative approach to welfare reform that avoids some 
of the problems and issues raised by the Congressional proposal. 
I. Block Grants: Ending EntitlementlPromoting Experiment 
The proposal to shift federal funding for AFDC from an open-ended 
entitlement to a block grant reduces federal spending on welfare, constrains 
the right to public aid, and consigns the basic responsibility for these 
programs to state agencies. Under the block grant arrangement, states will 
be squeezed fiscally but administratively freed to experiment with AFDC, 
redesigning the program according to their preferences. 
In anticipation of the block grants, states are starting to experiment with 
their AFDC programs. More than two thirds of the states have already 
adopted one or more experimental measures designed to change the 
behavior of welfare recipients, thus securing federal waivers of the 
categorical policy that currently governs AFDC.2 Aimed at encouraging 
self-sufficiency, these experimental measures involve policies that tie 
benefits to the requirement that recipients show progress toward a high 
school equivalency diploma, penalize recipients whose children do not 
attend school, and deny benefit increases to mothers who have additional 
children while on the rolls.3 Some states have initiated measures that allow 
an AFDC mother to retain the portion of the public assistance grant that is 
meant to provide for her child if she marries a person who is not the child's 
father4 - an incentive for AFDC mothers to get married, but not to the 
father of their children. 
Through the use of incentives to change human behavior, these various 
experimental measures are expected to reduce public costs of AFDC and to 
increase labor force participation. But this kind of social engineering does 
not always go exactly as planned. Indeed, the anticipation of unexpected 
results is, perhaps, the most dependable lesson to be drawn from past 
experiences of major shifts in social policy. As block grants free states to 
experiment with AFDC, there are possibilities for unintended outcomes of 
incentive-oriented policies designed to reduce costs and AFDC caseloads. 
There are four types of unintended outcomes that may emerge from 
2. Douglas 1. Besharov & Karen N. Gardiner, Paternalism and Welfare Reform, PUB. 
INTEREST, Winter 1996, at 70, 82. 
3. James J. Florio, New Jersey's Different Approach, PUB. WELFARE, Spring 1992, at 
7, 7; Robert Greenstein, Cutting Benefits vs. Changing Behavior, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 
1996, at 22, 22-23; Lawrence M. Mead, How Should Congress Respond, PUB. INTEREST, 
Winter 1996, at 14, 14. 
4. Florio, supra note 3, at 7. 
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incentive-oriented policies.5 
First, measures that penalize welfare beneficiaries for failing to do what 
is expected of them (attending job training, actively searching for jobs, and 
participating in public work projects) may generate high administrative costs 
that vastly override projected savings. These costs stem from efforts to 
insure compliance and to manage procedures for appeal; the appeal process 
can be particularly expensive when adjudication requires diagnostic 
judgments about welfare recipients who claim they are unable to comply 
with program demands because of physical ailments, psychological 
disorders, addictive behaviors, disabilities, family emergencies, and the like. 
For example, consider the experience in the multi-layered appeals structure 
of the Disability Insurance program under which a claimant who is denied 
benefits can request a reconsideration by the state agency; if denied again, 
the claimant can seek a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ); 
and if denied by the judge the claimant has final recourse to a review by the 
Appeals Council. In 1993, 746,425 cases were appealed at the State agency 
level; 346,423 of those cases proceeded to a second appeal before the ALJ, 
and 68,253 went on to the Appeals Council.6 
Second, measures that encourage and enable positive behavior, such as 
the provision of training and day care services, not only increase program 
costs initially, but may result in higher costs over longer periods. This is 
because these measures are vulnerable to the familiar problem of "cream-
ing," whereby additional benefits are delivered to those already highly 
motivated, most of whom would be likely to find work in the absence of 
these incentives. Such was the experience of earlier efforts at welfare 
reform. Among AFDC recipients, there are always some number of 
beneficiaries who will exit the rolls through their own efforts. Sar Levitan 
and Robert Taggart's evaluation of the Work Incentive Program (WIP), for 
example, revealed that most of 25,000 WIP enrollees who had gotten jobs 
by 1970 were among the applicants best prepared for work - those who 
would probably have found employment sooner or later without the 
additional WIP benefits.7 
Third, measures that limit access to welfare benefits can reduce 
immediate costs of AFDC, only to have these costs reappear in other 
program areas. Thus, if welfare mothers are denied benefits for failure to 
find work, remain in school, or other reasons, the declining cost of public 
assistance will eventually be met with rising public expenditures for 
5. NEIL GILBERT, WELFARE JUSTICE: RESTORING SOCIAL EQUITY 79-81 (1995). 
6. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 1030 CONG., 20 SESS., OVERVIEW OF 
ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: THE 1994 GREEN BOOK 56, 57 (Comrn. Print 1994). 
7. SAR A. LEVITAN & ROBERT TAGGART III, SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION AND 
MANPOWER POLICY: THE RHETORIC AND THE REALITY 52 (1971). 
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homeless shelters, child protective services, and food stamps. This is 
already happening. After California reduced state spending on AFDC by 
$10.8 billion in 1991, state budget analysts calculated that federal payments 
for food stamps to the state's residents rose by $4 billion.8 In the process 
of shifting the public burden from AFDC to other programs, the initial loss 
of benefits may exacerbate the problems of those in need, raising the long 
run costs of support and reintegration. 
Finally, measures that substantially reward beneficiaries of various 
programs for returning to work run the risk of creating a moral hazard. The 
problem, as Carolyn Weaver points out, is that these measures "deal[] with 
only half of the work incentive issue, ignoring entirely the incentives 
created for people still at work.,,9 The problem is pointedly illustrated by 
a successful AFDC "workfare" graduate who was highly publicized as a 
model case --until it was revealed that she had left a job to go on welfare 
in order to receive the job training provided by workfare benefits to welfare 
recipients entering the labor force. lO Beyond such anecdotal evidence, 
Duane Leigh found that the Family Independence Project, a five-year 
demonstration program in Washington that provided welfare clients 
financial incentives and increased social services, had little impact on 
earnings, but led to an increase in welfare receipt. ll Similarly, Robert 
Moffitt's estimates from a microsimulation model suggest that under certain 
conditions the benefits derived from employment and training programs 
positively effect the entry rate onto welfare rolls.12 
In assessing the prospects of social experiments that are likely to 
multiply under block grants, one should not overlook the obvious point that 
the success of many incentive-oriented policies rests, in part, on the 
availability of jobs for those whom these policies intend to motivate. A 
strong demand for labor is itself an incentive for workers to undertake 
training or retraining. 13 In periods of high unemployment, incentive-
oriented measures may press a few more workers into the labor market. At 
8. Douglas J. Besharov, The Welfare Balloon: Squeeze Hard on One Side and the 
Other Side Will Just Expand, WASH. POST, June II, 1995, at C4. 
9. Carolyn L. Weaver, Reassessing Federal Disability Insurance, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 
1992, at 108, 120. 
10. Mickey Kaus, The Work Ethic State, NEW REpUBLIC, Jui. 7, 1986, at 22, 28. 
11. Duane E. Leigh, Can a Voluntary Workfare Program Change the Behavior of Welfare 
Recipients? New Evidence from Washington State's Family Independence Program (FIP), 
141. POL'y ANALYSIS AND MGMT. 567, 567 (1995). 
12. Robert A. Moffitt, The Effect of Employment and Training Programs on Entry and 
Exitfrom the Welfare Caseload, 15 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 32, 39-48 (1996). The 
results also show small negative effects on entry rates, which are attributed to the burdens 
of participation in work programs. Id. 
13. Walter W. Heller, Employment and Manpower, in MEN WITHOUT WORK 68, 92 
(Stanley Lebergott ed., 1964). 
, . 
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the same time, however, many welfare beneficiaries will experience an 
increasing level of frustration as the social pressures created by behavioral 
incentives to work encounter limited opportunities for employment. Thus, 
incentive-oriented policies may wind up demoralizing those they are 
designed to encourage. 
In addition to experimentation with incentive-oriented policies, block 
grants will also allow states much greater latitude in defining eligibility 
standards and setting benefit levels. At the same time, the overall reduction 
of federal aid proposed under the block grants will create fiscal pressures 
on the states. Some critics fear that this will result in a race to the bottom, 
as states cut benefits not only to reduce immediate costs but to discourage 
welfare migration from neighboring states. 14 If recent proposals from New 
York's Governor Pataki are any indication, the race may already have 
started in anticipation of Federal reforms. The Governor's proposal 
includes a plan to reduce New York's AFDC grants by 26%, which would 
bring New York's benefits to the same level as New Jersey's.lS 
Block grants will increase fiscal pressures and administrative license to 
experiment with measures designed to reduce AFDC costs and promote self-
sufficiency. They may even trigger a race to the bottom. Will welfare 
recipients be motivated to work under the new arrangements? Will they 
suffer greater deprivation? Will welfare costs decrease? The shift to block 
grants introduces many concerns about unanticipated consequences of 
incentive-oriented policies and the extent to which social engineering or a 
flat reduction in grant levels will influence behavior and change welfare as 
we know it for the better. But there are other implications of the block 
grants-not as evident as welfare cost and client behavior-that bear on the 
future of public social services. 
II. The Future of Public Social Services Under Block Grants 
Since the early 1970s, there has been considerable growth in third-party 
purchase of service arrangements, through which public funds are used to 
pay for services delivered by private agencies. 16 This contracting for 
services is certain to increase under block grants for welfare and the 
increase is likely to be concentrated among community-based agencies. 
Recently, I attended a meeting at which half a dozen directors of 
14. Fear of Attracting Poor Could Push States to Slash Aid, Vol. 4, No. 11,4 WELFARE 
TO WORK, Pub. No. 11, 84, 84-85 (MIl Publications, 1995). 
15. James Dao, Pataki to Propose Sharply Reducing Welfare Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
3, 1995, at 1,47. 
16. Sheila B. Kamennan & Alfred J. Kahn, Child Care and Privatization under Reagan, 
in PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE 235, 244-45 (Sheila B. Kamennan et al. eds., 
1989); NEIL GILBERT, CAPITALISM AND THE WELFARE STATE 7-10 (1983). 
I, iii en t -i?f*W L 
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welfare departments in California were asked the following question: If the 
congressional proposals to create a block grant for welfare programs were 
implemented and the state passed the block grant through to the county 
level, what would you do? Hypothetically liberated from federal regulations 
that suffocate initiative, free to experiment and allocate funds as local needs 
dictate, the welfare directors all agreed on one immediate course of 
action--they would increasingly contract for services with community based 
organizations in the private sector. 
The recent enthusiasm for contracting with private locally-based 
organizations represents a level of commitment to community-based 
agencies that has not been seen since the community action movement of 
the mid-1960s. It is a commitment inspired by the felicitous convergence 
of two popular assumptions which suit the free market ideology of the right 
and the citizen participation/empowerment objectives of the left: first, that 
privatization offers the most efficient approach to the production and 
delivery of social services;l7 second, that community-based agencies are 
more effective and responsive than public bureaucracies because they reside 
closer to the people being served, mediating between the individual and the 
state. l8 
Under the first assumption, the case for the efficiency of privatization 
is linked to both the presumed advantages of competition and the failings 
of public bureaucracies that operate outside the market constraints of cost 
and competition (under governments responsive to interest group bargain-
ing). Those who question this assumption, suggest that the market 
metaphor does not exactly apply in the realm of social services because the 
forces of competition responsive to consumer choice are undermined by 
third-party purchase of service arrangements. l9 The entire transaction is 
perceived by neither the individual consumer who does not pay for the 
service nor the purchasing body, (public agency) which does not receive the 
service. Moreover, social service consumer populations--<;hildren, elderly, 
and poor--are often vulnerable and not well-informed consumers. In the 
absence of the market discipline imposed by well-informed consumers who 
pay for what they get, third-party purchase of services can have a difficult 
time insuring the quality of services being delivered. This is what Henry 
17. NEIL GILBERT & BARBARA GILBERT, THE ENABLING STATE 34 (1989); Ken Judge 
& Martin Knapp, Efficiency in the Production of Welfare: The Public and the Private 
Sectors Compared, in THE fuTURE OF WELFARE 131, 131-32 (Rudolf Klein et al. eds., 
1985). 
18. Robert N. Bellah, Community Properly Understood: A Defense of "Democratic 
Communitarianism, " THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter 1995-1996; HARRY SPECHT & 
MARK COURTNEY, UNFAITHFUL ANGELS 152-75 (1994). 
19. Susan Rose-Ackennan, Social Services and the Market, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1405, 
1405-06, 1412 (1983). 
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Hansmann describes as the "contract failure theory.,,2o 
Competitive bidding for third-party contracts has been used in efforts 
to address the problem of contract failure, which stems from the absence of 
competition and consumer choice. Evaluations of the competitive bidding 
mechanism in several areas of service, however, suggest that the results 
neither reduce costs nor enhance service quality.21 "Proxy shopping" is 
another method recommended to introduce the discipline of market 
competition into purchase-of-service arrangements, by contracting with 
service providers who can attract paying customers (who serve as proxy-
shoppers for public agencies). 22 Still, there must be enough suppliers to 
form a competitive market, which is often not the case when dealing with 
community-based agencies. Even if competition can be introduced into 
purchase-of-service arrangements, the problem remains that the transaction 
costs of contracting are quite high; these costs include complicated 
measurements to determine the price of units of service being purchased and 
expensive procedures to then monitor the quality of what is delivered.23 
One answer to these criticisms is that the transaction costs of purchasing 
services from private agencies may be mitigated by contracting with 
community-based agencies. The rationale is that community-based agencies 
will be accountable and responsive to their local consumer-constituency. 
Consumers influence these agencies by participatng directly in their 
governance structure. In essence, these agencies are local groups serving 
their own communities. Thus, even though the consumers do not pay for 
the services they are receiving, they are nevertheless in a strong position to 
influence the quality of these services. Under these circumstances the 
transaction costs of contracting can be reduced because monitoring for 
quality would be conducted by the consumers who have the power to 
influence their local organizations. 
Contracting then may be seen not only as a method for more efficient 
and effective delivery of services, but also as a mechanism for promoting 
the democratization of social services. Community-based agencies are 
mediating institutions-local, private, and responsive to the people 
served--that provide a cushion of civil society between the individual and 
the state. The case for contracting with community-based agencies is 
20. Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT 
SECTOR 27, 29-32 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987). 
21. Mark Schlesinger et al., Competitive Bidding and States I Purchase of Services: The 
Case of Mental Health Care in Massachusetts, J. OF POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT., Winter 
1986, at 245, 251-55. 
22. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 19, at 1412-15. 
23. Rosabeth M. Kanter & David V. Summers, Doing Well While Doing Good: 
Dilemmas of Performance Measurement in Nonprofit Organizations and the Need for a 
Multiple-Constituency Approach, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 20, at 154, 155-58. 
* Ii i. 
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further supported by the view that by minimizing the role of government in 
the delivery of social services these "mediating institutions will once again 
have the space to flower, reclaiming their rightful place at the center of a 
revitalized civil society.,,24 Thus, one might argue that public contracting 
for the delivery of social services with community-based agencies will 
produce more efficient and effective services, promote democracy and 
revitalize civil society. There is, however, another view of the trend toward 
contracting with community-based agencies that is somewhat less sanguine. 
Whether community-based agencies are more effective in delivering 
social services than public bureaucracies is an empirical question. Although 
such agencies are less bureaucratic, reside closer to the people being served 
and are more responsive to local influences, such characteristics do not 
guarantee greater effectiveness in service delivery.25 More to the point, 
abstract discourse on civil society, responsiveness and citizen empowerment 
tends to ignore the harsh fact that there is often a dense concentration of 
social problems in communities with the highest proportions of AFDC 
recipients. As Fred Wu1czyn reports, one out of eight children born in 
some of New York's poorest neighborhoods are admitted to foster care as 
infants. He estimates that the cumulative rate of foster care placement in 
these communities may be approaching 20%.26 Plagued by high levels of 
child abuse, family disorganization, and crime, these communities are, if not 
dysfunctional, at least extremely difficult to organize for constructive 
participation in the affairs of local agencies. 
Effectiveness and local responsiveness aside, the plain fact is that 
community-based agencies often deliver social services for lower costs than 
public bureaucracies. They deliver services for less because they pay their 
workers less than the public bureaucracies, which represent, perhaps, the 
last stronghold of the union movement in the United States. From 1970 to 
1991 union membership in the U.S. declined from 28% to 16% of the labor 
force and over the same period union members in government employment 
increased from approximately 10% to 40% of all unionized labor.27 One 
reason, of course, is that organized labor in government is largely in the 
service sector; unlike industrial production, these service jobs could not be 
24. Charles Krauthammer, A Social Conservative Credo, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1995, at 15, 
16. 
25. As Peter Blau observed long ago, bureaucracy and democracy are different modes of 
social organization for decision-making and implementation that are effective for different 
ends. See PETER M. BLAU, BUREAUCRACY IN MODERN SOCIETY 105-108 (1956). 
26. Fred Wulczyn, Status at Birth and Infant Placements in New York City, in CHILD 
WELFARE RESEARCH REVIEW 146, 149-50 (Richard Barth et al. eds., 1994). 
27. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
U.S. 411-12 (1981); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 422 (1992). 
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shipped overseas to be performed at a lower cost. Instead, they are now 
being contracted out to local community organizations, which are relatively 
small, voluntary non-profit units that have few ties to organized labor. 
Ironically, efforts to revitalize civil society through support of 
geographically-based mediating institutions are being promoted at the cost 
of functionally-based communities of organized labor, which also constitute 
powerful mediating institutions. Indeed, in his classic analysis, Emile 
Durkheim noted: "A nation can be maintained only if, between the State 
and the individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups 
near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in there sphere of 
action.,,28 With organizations based on territorial divisions (villages, 
districts) becoming less important, Durkheim envisioned occupational 
groups emerging to fill the void and recreate a sense of social solidarity. 
Philosophical arguments about the place and functional role of 
community institutions in civil society will not mitigate the increasing fiscal 
pressures on State Departments of Welfare to contract out the delivery of 
services under block grants. After weighing all the consequences, the shift 
from public social services to community-based delivery structures may be 
desirable. But first, the trade-offs should be made explicit, particularly the 
implications for organized labor and the future role of public social services. 
III. Why Work Requirements and Time Limits Won't Work 
Although they may not entirely agree on the details of welfare reform, 
policymakers on both sides of the political spectrum are joined in the view 
that work must replace welfare and that dependency on public aid must be 
abolished. This sentiment is firmly expressed not only in the Republican 
proposal, but also in Bill Clinton's campaign statements that welfare 
recipients should be required to work after two years.29 A moderate echo 
is heard in the centrist Democratic Progressive Policy Institute's call for 
reform: 
An enabling strategy for welfare reform should buttress America's 
basic values, especially reciprocal responsibility.... Social 
responsibility is a two-way street: Government can help only those 
determined to help themselves. An enabling state should condition 
social supports on recipients' willingness to work and strive toward 
self-sufficiency. 30 
28. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 28 (George Simpson trans., 
1933). 
29. Douglas J. Besharov, A Monster of His Own Creation, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1995, 
at A31. 
30. WILL MARSHALL & ELAINE C. KAMARCK, Rep/acing Welfare with Work, in 
MANDATE FOR CHANGE 217, 233 (Will Marshall et al. eds., 1993). 
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Under the current proposal for welfare reform, states receiving block 
grants are given almost complete license to redesign their programs with 
two major conditions: recipients must be required to work after two years, 
and recipients remain eligible for cash assistance no longer than five years. 
What would happen to welfare recipients who were unable to secure 
employment after the first two years? One response is that those who had 
not found a job after two years would be required to participate in some 
form of public works program established by the state. This is a tough-
sounding quick fix that ignores three compelling problems. 
First, those unemployed after two years are likely to include many of 
the least skilled and least motivated in the welfare population, a group 
poorly prepared for employment even in public works projects. The reading 
skills of the typical AFDC teen-age mother, for example, are estimated to 
range from below the sixth grade to the eighth grade leve1.31 Findings 
from the Columbia University Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse 
(1994) indicate that 37% of AFDC mothers between the ages of 18 and 24 
abuse or are addicted to alcohol and drugs. 32 Since they rely on self-
reports of abuse and include frequent and infrequent use, these findings are, 
at best, a rough approximation of the problem. 
Second, even if inadequate education and substance abuse are not at 
issue, the social and economic costs of employing these AFDC mothers in 
public works are staggering. Estimates by the Congressional Budget Office 
indicate that expenditures for supervision and day care would amount to 
$6,300 per participant. 33 ·With the average AFDC grant totalling about 
$5,000, participation in mandatory work programs would more than double 
the costs for each welfare recipient, without any increase in their basic 
grant. Fiscal concerns aside, the cynicism and demoralization bred by 
make-work would surely undermine the already shaky standards of public 
bureaucracies. 
Finally, questions remain concerning what to do about AFDC recipients 
who refuse to participate in either training programs or public works, and 
what to do about those who malinger on the job. Following the various 
state experiments with incentive-oriented policies, the response to this 
behavior would no doubt range from a sharp reduction to the total 
suspension of the AFDC grant. In any event, the grants would be slated for 
elimination after five years. 
31. Lloyd Pryor, The Single Welfare Mother and Deficiency in Reading, 15 YOUTH POL 'y 
38, 41 (1994); Besharov & Gardiner, supra note 2, at 77. 
32. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND WOMEN ON WELFARE, 1,2 (Columbia University's Center 
on Addiction and Substance Abuse ed., 1994). 
33. Douglas Besharov, Escaping the Dole; For Young Unwed Mothers, Welfare Reform 
Alone Can't Make Work Pay, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1993, at C3, C4. 
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Work requirements and time-limited AFDC policies that result in the 
reduction and eventual elimination of the AFDC grant are remarkably 
evasive about what will happen to the children in these families, for whom 
the program (first called Aid to Dependent Children) was originally devised. 
The five-year time limit, particularly, is stone silent regarding the fate of 
children once benefits are terminated. If enacted as proposed, these 
measures will be to welfare in the mid-1990s what deinstitutionalization was 
to mental illness in the mid-1960s. The deferred costs of that decision still 
plague our cities today. 
As the focus of concern has shifted from protecting children to 
requiring that AFDC parents go to work, policy initiatives encounter the 
limits of social engineering in this realm. This is not a new story. 
Analyzing the costs and results of the early "workfare" reforms more than 
twenty years ago, Gilbert Steiner observed: 
Unfortunately, the sorry history and limitations of day care and 
work training as "solutions" to the welfare problem could not be 
faced by the administration's welfare specialists in 1970 .... But 
after a few years it will inevitably be discovered that work training 
and day care have had little effect on the number of welfare 
dependents and no depressing effect on public relief costs. Some 
new solution will then be proposed, but the more realistic approach 
would be to accept the need for more welfare and to reject 
continued fantasizing about day care and "workfare" as miracle 
cures.34 
The new solutions now being proposed involve radical variations on 
workfare that are more stringent in their demands, but no more likely to 
succeed than earlier schemes which, as Steiner notes, had little effect on the 
number of clients or AFDC costs. 
IV. Welfare Reform: A Child-Centered Alternative 
The Congressional proposal to transform AFDC overlooks the fact that 
welfare as we know it often works well as a social safety net. F or many 
families, AFDC serves not as a poverty trap, but as a temporary support in 
hard times. Research based on annual data indicates that about 48% of all 
AFDC spells last less than two years.3S An even higher proportion of 
short-stays emerge from analysis based on monthly data, which indicates 
34. GILBERT Y. STEINER, THE STATE OF WELFARE 74 (1971). 
35. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS ANo MEANS, 1030 CONG., 20 SESS., supra note 6, 
at 440. The figure of success for short-tenn cases can be somewhat misleading since one-
third of these cases will enroll in AFDC again sometime in the future. Id. 
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that 700/0 of initial spells on welfare last two years or less.36 The picture 
changes, however, when the analysis shifts from the length of spells for 
everyone who received welfare benefits over the last ten years to an 
examination of the length of spells for those on the welfare rolls at anyone 
point in time. Here, the research based on annual and monthly data indicate 
that at any point in time about 50% of those on welfare are in the midst of 
spells that will last eight years or more.37 Thus, looking at the AFDC 
population over a ten-year period, the typical recipient would be a short-
term user, while at any point in time during that period the AFDC rolls 
would be composed predominantly of long-term users. 
Reform measures that ignore the substantial proportion of successful 
short-term cases are likely to increase program expenses still further. That 
is, providing various transitional incentives to work after two years on 
AFDC raises the costs of public support for all those families that 
previously would have left the rolls in the absence of these benefits. The 
essential problem with the current proposal for welfare reform is that it does 
not distinguish among recipients in terms of competence and motivation. 
It deals too generously with those who are most competent and motivated, 
and too harshly with the recipients who are least competent and motivated. 
Can anything be done to make welfare more equitable without 
increasing the cost of benefits by the creation of transitional incentives and 
public works programs? Can welfare be made equitable without implement-
ing time-limits and financial sanctions that would impose hardships on 
children? An alternative approach to welfare reform begins with the need 
to distinguish among AFDC families and to insure the well-being of 
children.38 This is no simple matter. 
Families enter the AFDC program for different reasons and remain on 
the rolls for varying periods of time. About 600/0 of AFDC spells begin 
because of either a decline in family earnings or a divorce (or separation) 
of married couples with children. 39 These cases need to be treated 
differently from the 30% of AFDC spells that begin when an unmarried 
woman has a child. 
The reason is simple. Welfare applicants who were married or 
employed for some period of time, say at least 18 months prior to 
enrollment in AFDC, had been independent citizens abiding by social 
conventions. It is reasonable to presume that they are competent and 
motivated to become self-sufficient. Thus, applicants who are pushed into 
36. Id. at 441-42. 
37. Id. 
38. The design of this child-centered approach to welfare reform draws on the proposal 
developed by Neil Gilbert. See GILBERT, supra note 5, at 169-72. 
39. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, l03D CONG., 2D SESS., supra note 6, 
at 451. 
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the program because of a marital break up or a decline in their family 
income should be awarded AFDC benefits and left alone for two years to 
reorganize their lives. A high proportion of them will be among the 48% 
to 70% of recipients who leave the welfare rolls of their own volition in 
less than two years.40 Those remaining on AFDC after two years would 
then be enrolled in the first phase of intervention, which leads to what 
might be termed "managed dependency.,,41 
Women who enter the AFDC program because of out-of-wedlock births 
are another matter. For one thing, they are younger and more likely to be 
long-term recipients than those in the other group. Estimates of the risk for 
long-term welfare receipt indicate that over 40% of never-married women 
with a young child who enroll in AFDC under the age of twenty six will 
spend ten years or more on the welfare rolls.42 Futhermore, their children 
are at greater risk of harm, as indicated by this group's excessive rates of 
child abuse and neglect.43 The risk of abuse is even greater when the 
single parent is a teenager.44 
More than other segments of the population, policymakers want to get 
tough with unwed-teenage mothers, in part because their long-term reliance 
on welfare is very costly. The appeal of firm work requirements and time-
limits is that they will seemingly put an end to the pattern of long-term 
welfare dependency by never-married single-mothers. While AFDC no 
doubt contributes to this pattern of dependency, it did not create the single-
mother culture of poverty and will not eliminate it with time-limits. But 
this group should be targeted for special intervention, if for no other reason 
than to protect the children at risk. 
The selective focus and compulsory nature of the special interventions, 
such as home-health visiting, proposed for AFDC teenage mothers run 
counter to the conventional liberal view that government programs should 
be universal and voluntary--universal so that services do not discriminate 
in ways that might label some groups as less worthy or competent than 
others, and voluntary so that they do not impose any kind of social control. 
Even though children most at risk are found disproportionately in the 
households of teenage mothers on AFDC, one might ask, why not provide 
special interventions for all families? To be sure, some children outside of 
teenage AFDC families would benefit from a universal approach to social 
40. Id. at 441, 442. 
41. GILBERT, supra note 5, at 169. 
42. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., supra note 6, 
at 451. 
43. Lorraine V. Klerman, The Relationship Between Adolescent Parenthood and 
Inadequate Parenting, 15 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES REv. 309, 317 (1993). 
44. Kristin C. Collins & Mariam R. Chacko, Adolescent Parenthood: Role of the 
Pediatrician, 15 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES REv. 295, 298 (1993). 
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intervention. However, to the extent that one views home health visits, for 
example, as a form of surveillance and social control meddling in family 
life, targeting the intervention imposes public authority on fewer households 
and is less intrusive for the general population. Moreover, to the extent that 
risk to children is disproportionately high among teenage AFDC families, 
targeting the intervention allows for a more efficient allocation of resources. 
V. What AFDC Refonns Should Insure Children's Well-being? 
Instead of emphasizing forced labor and "make-work" schemes, the 
child-centered alternative would be divided into two phases of social 
supervision. The first phase would involve a service strategy aimed to 
provide practical assistance to mothers and protection to their children. 
These efforts would center around weekly or bi-weekly home-health visiting 
that would offer support to young mothers, as well as careful supervision 
of their childcare practices. This intense periodic monitoring is probably 
the best form of protection that the state can furnish against abuse and 
neglect of young children, short of high quality institutional care. In very 
high risk cases where more protection is needed than that afforded by 
periodic home-health visiting, group homes would be made available for 
unwed-teenage mothers and their children, substituting AFDC benefits in 
the form of board and care for cash grants. Along with home-health 
visiting, efforts to help AFDC mothers would include encouragement of 
school drop-outs to complete their high school requirements, assistance in 
home management, and development of systematic plans for reintegration 
into the labor force. 
After three years, those still on AFDC would enter the second phase in 
which greater social controls would be employed, reflecting the recipients' 
emerging status as "wards of the state," rather than temporary dependents. 
Home visiting to monitor the well-being of children would continue and the 
level of public assistance grants would remain the same. During this phase, 
however, a case manager would be assigned to exercise increased regulation 
over each family's financial affairs, which would entail the manager's 
payment of rent, utilities, and weekly allocations of food stamps. There 
would also be increased monitoring of any outside resources available to 
recipients, which would reduce their AFDC grants. 
Tightening social control through case managers and home health 
visitors would certainly raise the cost of AFDC, though with brief training, 
welfare recipients might fill many of the home-visiting jobs. This approach 
will not eliminate long-term dependency. It would, however, still be a 
relatively inexpensive way for society to protect vulnerable children, while 
giving notice that long term public dependence would be accompanied by 
greater public surveillance. Increasing the role of public authority in 
recipients' lives would make welfare less attractive to some who might 
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otherwise be employed. Closer monitoring would also limit the amount of 
unreported income, which is quite frequently available to supplement AFDC 
grants.45 
This is a modest goal. Those who demand more would do well to heed 
Steiner's counsel against "tireless tinkering with dependent families.,,46 
Although AFDC may help to sustain the never-married single-parent culture 
of poverty, welfare did not create this unhealthy pattern of behavior, and 
forces larger than those generated by welfare reform will be required to 
eliminate it. 
Indeed, a serious effort to reduce welfare must go well beyond 
adjustments in AFDC. Make-work, time limits, and transitional benefits are 
no substitutes for employment in the private sector that leaves working 
people substantially better off than those receiving a combination of 
welfare, food stamps, and Medicaid. The best and fairest incentive is to 
increase the work-related benefits of the low-paying jobs that many welfare 
recipients might perform. Progress has been made along these lines with 
the expansion of tax-based social transfers, such as the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC). Many policy analysts urge increasing these indirect social 
transfers and adding other tax -based supports so that working families are 
lifted above the poverty level. 47 Working families also need the security 
of medical protection, which welfare recipients receive through Medicaid. 
Finally, there is widespread agreement that absent fathers should be held 
responsible to provide financial support for their children, though resources 
for such support may be rather limited among fathers of children in the 
AFDC population. 
Even with all this, dependency will not disappear. Whether due to 
personal deficiencies or forces beyond their control, people in need of care 
will always be with us. Social reforms aimed at alleviating dependency 
should not condemn children for the hard luck or personal frailties of their 
parents. 
45. Christopher Jencks & Kathryn Edin, The Real Welfare Problem, AM. PROSPECT, 
Spring 1990, at 31, 32-33. 
46. STEINER, supra note 34, at 31-74. 
47. See DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 237-
38 (1988); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY 233-34 (1992). 
